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Guy Bennett-Hunter 
 
Abstract: In this paper, I argue for the usefulness of pragmatism as a framework within which to 
develop the theological application of emergentist theory. I consider some philosophical issues relevant 
to the recent revival of interest, across various disciplines, in the concept of emergence and clarify some 
of the conceptual issues at stake in the attempts to formulate the philosophical position of emergentism 
and to apply it theologically. After highlighting some major problems arising from the main existing 
ways of formulating emergentism, I build on the work of Sami Pihlström, outlining a less problematic, 
alternative proposal. I attempt to show that the philosophical problems can be circumvented by an 
appeal to the pragmatist tradition, which is a useful philosophical framework within which to develop 
an emergentist theory that is fit for theological application. 
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I: Introduction: The Meaning of ‘Emergence' 
 
 In the broadest possible terms, the concept of emergence is supposed to describe what happens 
when systems reach a certain level of complexity, at which point ‘new’ properties or entities are said to 
emerge. I shall call such emergents, which are variously taken to be properties or entities, ‘emergent 
phenomena’. On the one hand, there has to be an important connection between the system, from 
which the phenomena emerge, and the phenomena themselves. In general terms, this connection is 
usually taken to be a dependence relation and, in particular, the specific kind of dependence relation in 
play is often thought to be supervenience. On the other hand, however, in order to count as emergent, 
phenomena have also to be novel with respect to the system out of which they supposedly emerge. We 
might capture the relevant kind of novelty in the mereological claim that such emergent phenomena are 
not, at any stage, possessed by any of the parts of that system. Or it could be captured temporally, in 
the thought that emergent phenomena did not exist before the system existed or when it was in a less 
complex state.  
 
 Unsurprisingly, there is a great deal of debate over not only what constitutes an appropriate 
balance between dependence and novelty (of the relevant kinds) but also over whether these are 
mutually compatible. The question of the compatibility of these concepts is the main conceptual issue 
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at stake in philosophical discussions of emergence because their combination is a key common feature 
of philosophical theories of emergentism.2 But before discussing this important question of 
compatibility in section III below, I want to clarify the distinction, referred to by Philip Clayton as the 
‘red thread’ in discussions of emergence, between weak and strong versions of emergence theory.3 My 
purpose, in what follows, is not merely to reiterate the commonplace distinction between weak and 
strong emergence but rather to clarify it with a view to considering, in later sections, why and how the 
distinction might fruitfully be transcended. 
 
 
II: Emergence, Weak and Strong 
 
 A weak understanding treats emergence as a concept that helps us to think about certain kinds 
of phenomena. For example, there comes a point where it is less helpful to think in terms of large 
numbers of interconnected neurons and more helpful to think in terms of conscious minds. 
‘Emergence’, on a weak understanding, is just the term we use to articulate and accommodate that fact 
about our epistemology. On this weak understanding, it does not follow from the epistemological fact 
just mentioned that conscious minds are real things - that there is any independent reality that falls under 
the conceptual category of consciousness. What we think and speak of as conscious minds are really, 
ontologically, just large numbers of neurons interconnected in the appropriate ways.  
 
 A strong understanding of emergence, by contrast, treats it as a concept that refers not just to 
our conceptual world but to the real world, reality, itself. If we need the concept of emergence, on a 
strong understanding, this is because emergence really happens. Consequently, emergent phenomena 
should be understood as real entities, that are novel with respect to their emergence bases. For 
example, there comes a point in the developing complexity of neurological systems where it is not just 
more helpful for us to think and talk about conscious minds but where conscious minds actually come into 
being, when they can be said to emerge in this stronger sense.  
 
 The main effect on emergentism of this distinction between weak and strong emergence may be 
summarised as follows. The strength of the notion of emergence accepted by a given emergentist has a 
determining effect on the weighting that is given, respectively, to dependence and novelty in that 
emergentist theory.  
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 Starting at the weaker end, where emergence is thought to be best understood 
epistemologically, such theories tend to be weighted away from the notion of novelty and towards 
notions of dependence and supervenience. The novelty in play here is of such a weak kind that a great 
many properties would count as emergent if the concept were not further restricted. As Kim writes, 
“this object on my desk has the property of being a ballpoint pen, although none of its parts are 
ballpoint pens”.4 Kim's example illustrates that, on a very weak understanding of emergence, 
dependence is emphasised to such an extent that the novelty becomes unsurprising and perhaps trivial. 
It is not, in the second example, that a ballpoint pen is not ‘ontologically’ a ballpoint pen. The point is 
that the fact that the pen’s microstructure is not itself made up of ballpoint pens is unsurprising and 
uncontroversial because the property of being a ballpoint pen supervenes on the microstructure of 
ballpoint pens. The property (if it is one) of being a ballpoint pen is entirely dependent on the 
properties of the microstructure of the object that possesses it. It follows that two objects with identical 
lower-level properties and structures could not differ with respect to their higher-level properties (as 
could be the case if strong emergence occurred): both objects will be ballpoint pens. Extremely weak 
emergentist theories such as this emphasise dependence to the point where the required kind of novelty 
(novelty of a surprising or conceptually interesting kind) is very difficult to establish. 
 
 By contrast, consider the example often given to illustrate strong emergence: (human) 
consciousness. David Chalmers, who argues that the vast majority of cases of emergence are weak, also 
suggests that consciousness is the one and only case of a strongly emergent phenomenon.5 For these 
purposes, a conscious system is defined, in Spriggean terms, as a system for which there is something it 
is like to be that system.6 The view that consciousness should be regarded as a strongly emergent 
property of certain systems, Kim says, requires the notion of supervenience. Since supervenience is a 
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for strong emergence, the strong emergentist about mind must 
allow that mentality both supervenes on and emerges from physical or biochemical basal conditions.7 
In order to obtain novelty, and therefore strong emergence, in the presence of supervenience, the 
emergentist has to add that there can be no warranted process of reduction, explanation, prediction or 
derivation between the ontological ‘levels’.8 To apply this thought to the example of consciousness, the 
strong emergentist has to accept the supervenience of the mental on the physical. At the same time, 
however, she also has to deny that the mental can be reduced to the physical, that it can be explained in 
terms of it, predicted on the basis of it or derived from it.  
 
 Kim suggests that the appropriate concept of reduction, which the emergentist has to deny 
holds in cases of strong emergence, is a functional one because this also entails prediction, explanation 
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and therefore, I extrapolate, ‘derivability’.9 The functional reduction of conscious experiences, via 
behaviour, to brain states by way of philosophical conceptual work is followed by the scientific, 
empirical search for the ‘neural realizers’ of those functionally reduced experiences.10 This concerns 
strong emergence insofar as “the emergentist’s question, ‘Would complete knowledge of the 
neurophysiology of an organism suffice for deriving knowledge about the organism’s consciousness?’ 
could be answered affirmatively, if mentality has been functionally reduced.”11 On the view that Kim 
describes as the classical account of strong emergence, in order to count as such, emergent properties 
have to be irreducible in the above, functional sense and they also have to supervene on their 
emergence bases.12 This strong view of emergence adds functional irreducibility to supervenience in an 
attempt to obtain a more robust conception of novelty. 
 
 However, while philosophers like Kim (who is sceptical about the defensibility of strong 
emergentism) associate emergence and supervenience with each other, others suggest, in the opposite 
direction, that the distinction between emergence and supervenience should be characterised in terms 
of contrast. For example, Achim Stephan highlights the relevant issue as being the explanatory 
irreducibility of emergent properties to their bases, which involves the finer distinction between 
emergence and what has been called ‘superdupervenience’.13 The latter term is defined as “an 
explanatorily relevant strong notion of supervenience”, an “ontological supervenience that is robustly 
explainable in a materialistically explainable way” and explicable as “primarily a relation of explanatory 
reducibility”.14 The distinction between supervenience and superdupervenience amounts to a 
distinction between a type of ontological dependence captured by the familiar sloganized expression of 
supervenience (‘there cannot be an A-difference without a B-difference’) and ontological dependence 
combined with explanatory reducibility. This distinction allows the strong emergentist to deny that 
emergent phenomena ‘superdupervene’ on the properties and relations of the parts of the system while 
simultaneously allowing that they supervene mereologically upon them.15 Extremely strong versions of 
emergentism such as this are weighted towards novelty to the point where ontological dependence is 
affirmed but distinguished from explanatory reducibility, which, in accordance with Kim’s desiderata, is 
denied. 
 
 The landscape is complicated by the fact that the choice facing would-be emergentists is not a 
straightforward choice between a weak and a strong conception of emergence but rather a range of 
choices between a plethora of concepts that differ in strength.16 But the extreme examples (weak and 
strong), given above, illustrate the general character of the spectrum of emergentist theories in which 
this variety results. Weaker forms stress dependence to the point where, to a greater or lesser degree, 
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the kind of novelty involved can start to look trivial. Stronger ones, by contrast, stress novelty to the 
point where the distinction between ontological dependence and explanatory reducibility has to be 
introduced in order that dependence can be preserved. 
 
 Having sketched the terrain, I want, in the next section, to examine the vexed question of the 
compatibility of dependence and novelty in the context of philosophical theories of emergentism. For it 
will by now be clear that such emergentism, of whatever strength, will stand or fall with the 
compatibility of these concepts. If dependence were emphasised to the point of incompatibility with 
novelty, then we would have a base with nothing, even possibly, emerging out of it. Equally, if novelty 
were stressed to the point of incompatibility with dependence, we would have emergent phenomena 
with no base from which to emerge. The viability of emergentism, therefore, depends upon novelty and 
dependence being held together in a delicate balance. 
 
 
III: Are Dependence and Novelty Compatible? 
 
 In what I have been arguing so far, an implicit distinction has been at work: the distinction 
between emergence and emergentism. I have been suggesting that concepts of emergence impact upon 
the philosophical theories of emergentism into which they are incorporated in different ways according 
to their strength. Throughout its short history, emergentism, especially the kind that incorporates a 
strong understanding of emergence, has been associated with a position that is today known as non-
reductive physicalism. The classical emergentist, Samuel Alexander, expresses this thought in relation to 
life, understood as an emergent phenomenon: 
 
 Physical and chemical processes of a certain complexity have  the quality of life. The new 
quality of life emerges with    this constellation of such processes, and therefore life is 
  at once a physico-chemical complex and is not merely physical  and chemical, for 
these terms do not sufficiently  characterise the new complex which in the course and order of 
 time has been generated out of them.17 
 
Russell Re Manning glosses Alexander’s emergentist position about ‘life’ as follows:  
 
 Alexander’s ‘emergentism’, is a product of the search  for a third way between the 
extremes of vitalism and empiricism, in order to explain the processes of life scientifically 
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without reducing them to the epiphenomenal residue of the material. To use contemporary 
terminology, Alexander’s account is physicalist in as much as he rejects vital substances; it is 
nonreductive in as much as he retains the legitimacy of irreducible vital qualities.18 
 
More recently, as Re Manning continues, Philip Clayton uses Alexander’s basic proposals as a basis for 
his own suggestions concerning the possibilities for the application of strong emergentism in the 
context of theology.19 Accordingly, Clayton intimates that emergentism promises to provide a third way 
between physicalism and dualism, undercutting the ‘hegemony’ of the dichotomy between them.20 In 
his sketch of an emergentist theory of mind, Clayton attempts to achieve a delicate balance between the 
conception of mind in physical and mental terms. He wishes to avoid a conception of mind as wholly 
physical. Based on the assumption that there can be no mental causes, such a conception would result 
in empirical descriptions of neurological activity. On the other hand, he also hopes to avoid a 
conception of the mind in purely mental terms and the concomitant assumption that it could have no 
connection or, at best, a contingent connection to the central nervous system. As Clayton summarises 
his position, 
 
 The balance that we seek conceives mind as a type of property  that emerges from the 
brain, which though different from    remains continually dependent on its subvenient 
base.21 
 
Like Kim, then, Clayton clearly believes that supervenience is a necessary condition for emergence, 
hence his term ‘emergentist supervenience’.22  
 
 At times, Clayton seems to want to distance himself from the view that, although everything is 
ultimately physical, not all explanations have to be given in physical terms.23 He expresses agreement 
with Kim that “this view is an inherently unstable position rather than a useful halfway point between 
other options”.24 However, it not clear that his own attempted ‘balance’ between mentalist and 
physicalist accounts of mind, which, in his view, can eventually be helpfully recruited into the service of 
theology, does not itself amount to the attempt to sustain such a position. Indeed, the attempt to 
establish non-reductive physicalism appears to be the main philosophical purpose of emergentism and 
the reason why it is often formulated. Indeed, as a theologian, Clayton is attracted to strong 
emergentism on account of its promise to establish non-reductive physicalism.25 He is attracted by its 
promise to allow acceptance both of the scientifically credible view that everything is ultimately physical 
and of the theologically attractive claim that not all explanations have to be given in physical terms; in 
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other words, the promise coherently to combine ontological monism with explanatory pluralism.26 
Clayton’s position may be described as strongly, as opposed to weakly, emergentist on account of his 
thesis that explanatory pluralism is actually, in his view, begotten by ontological pluralism. He believes 
that “the best explanation for explanatory pluralism is ontological pluralism.”27 
 
 Although the establishing of non-reductive physicalism may not exhaust the point of 
emergentism, it is a philosophical purpose for which emergentism has been used throughout its history 
and one that makes it appear, to thinkers like Clayton, theologically attractive. As intimated above, 
insofar as they seek to establish non-reductive physicalism (for whatever purpose), emergentist theories 
require the compatibility of dependence and novelty. But, in what follows, I want to suggest that the 
different forms of emergentism compromise this compatibility in different ways. I therefore agree with 
Kim (and, at times, Clayton) that the position of non-reductive physicalism is inherently unstable. In 
the remainder of this section, I illustrate that instability in further detail. 
  
 At one end of the emergentist spectrum, weaker forms of emergentism have the advantage of 
being able to draw on the scientific credibility that is associated with weak concepts of emergence. On 
account of the compatibility of emergence, weakly construed, with reduction, scientists incline towards 
the use of weak concepts of emergence.28 Many scientific (and some philosophical) explanations 
proceed by means the reduction of phenomena that are not yet fully understood to others that are. 
Weak concepts of emergence are quite at home in such contexts. Although, epistemologically 
construed, emergent phenomena are not irreducible in principle, they may be so in practice if there is 
no obvious way of reducing them to phenomena that are already understood or if the relationship 
between them and fully intelligible phenomena is not yet clear. Although phenomena that are emergent 
in this sense may, at some point in the future, turn out to be just highly complex aggregations of the 
parts of a system, we currently have no way of exhaustively articulating such a picture. At present, 
therefore, it is just easier for us to think and speak about the system itself as a simple emergent entity - 
hence the need for a concept of emergence. The weakest forms of emergentism leave emergent 
phenomena under the continuous threat of reduction, perhaps even elimination, as our knowledge 
progresses.29 Insofar as the advance of human understanding is a good thing, this is a fact that should 
be welcomed. A philosophical theory of emergentism that makes use of such a weak concept of 
emergence, emphasising dependence, will be able to capitalize on the scientific acceptability of this 
form of emergentism. This is a feature that might make this kind of emergentism particularly attractive 
to theologians who are interested in eliminating or mitigating the apparent tension between scientific 
and religious or theological perspectives on the world by construing the latter as emergent from the 
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former. This would be especially true if the novelty promised by this weak form of emergentism were 
mistaken for the irreducible kind supposedly achieved by its stronger cousin. 
 However, as already intimated, the difficulty is that the weaker versions of emergentism 
emphasise dependence to the point of incompatibility with an irreducible, non-trivial and therefore 
conceptually interesting kind of novelty. As is shown by Kim’s view of the affinity between emergence 
and supervenience, such weak forms nicely capture the dependence relation that emergent phenomena 
must have with their emergence bases but with the consequence that they are perfectly compatible with 
reductionism. If A supervenes on B, which is to say that one cannot bring about a change in B without 
also bringing about a change in A, then A is reducible to B, which is to say that A just consists in B - 
although it may still be helpful to think and speak of ‘A’s as though they were separate entities from 
‘B’s. Clayton suggests that, ontological irreducibility requires both explanatory irreducibility and causal 
irreducibility.30 Weakly emergent phenomena are causally reducible to their emergence bases, though 
not explanatorily reducible to them, therefore they are susceptible to ontological reduction. And if the 
dictum attributed to Samuel Alexander, that “to be real is to have causal power”,31 is correct, then such weak 
forms of emergentism will struggle to establish the causal efficacy - the reality - of emergent 
phenomena. Consequently, weak emergentism has less mileage for useful application in disciplines like 
theology inasmuch as it turns out to be a form of physicalism, which, though not explanatorily 
reductive, is compatible with ontological reduction. 
 
 So weak forms emergentism can give us scientific credibility by stressing the dependence of 
emergent phenomena on their bases. They can do so only by emphasising dependence to the point of 
incompatibility with the robust, ontological kind of novelty that could justify the required explanatory 
pluralism in principle rather than merely in practice. Therefore, the possibility of the required delicate 
balance between dependence and novelty is undermined. 
  
 With stronger versions of emergentism, according to which emergent phenomena enjoy real 
existence, the same problem applies in its reverse formulation. Strong emergentism promises to supply 
real emergent phenomena that are causally efficacious and therefore evade the threat of causal, and 
hence ontological, reduction. Even if emergent phenomena supervene on their emergence bases,32 two 
systems with identical lower-level properties could differ with respect to their higher-level, emergent 
properties. In addition, while the causal activity of supervenients can be reduced, in Kim’s functional 
sense, strongly emergent emergents have independent causal efficacy. This is referred to as Downward 
Causation: a wider, thorny issue in the emergence debate. If emergent phenomena are real, and if to be 
real is to have causal power, then real emergent phenomena must be causally efficacious. Since the 
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causal efficacy of strongly emergent phenomena cannot, by definition, be reduced to that of its 
emergence base, a strongly emergent phenomenon must be able to exert ‘downward’ causal influence 
on the base from which it emerges. To return to the example of consciousness: if consciousness 
strongly emerges from the central nervous system (is explanatorily, causally and therefore ontologically 
irreducible to it), then its causal efficacy will not be merely specious and reducible to that of the central 
nervous system. Rather, consciousness will have a causal efficacy of its own, mental causation, and will 
be able to exert downward causal influence on the central nervous system from which it emerged. For 
example, my ability to raise my arm by thinking about it will be an instance of downward (mental) 
causation, if my thinking about raising an arm is explanatorily, causally and ontologically irreducible to 
the activity of my central nervous system. 
 
 These features of strong emergentism, with emphasis on the required kind of novelty, 
apparently allow it to resist reductive physicalism without having to give up the scientific credibility 
gained by a stated commitment to physicalism. They also make it look promising with respect to its 
potential theological application. But, arguably, strong emergentism can only be genuinely non-
reductive by giving up physicalism, and any associated scientific credibility, altogether, since physicalism 
is by definition reductive (if not eliminative or some combination of the two).33 The possibility of 
downward causal influence, which the strong emergentist is forced to entertain, violates the scientific 
truism that the physical world is causally closed. Therefore, the strong emergentist must either reject 
the closure principle or face the impossible task of showing how the downward causation of emergent 
phenomena is consistent with physical causal closure.34 The required kind of novelty, represented by 
the notion of Downward Causation, problematises the dependence relation that emergent phenomena 
must have with their emergence bases, especially when those bases are held to be purely physical. It 
creates the difficult problem of how what is not (or not entirely) physical can possibly supervene on the 
physical. Given strong emergentism’s philosophical status as a form of non-reductive physicalism, 
Downward Causation, as Clayton admits, is its Achilles heel. In tension with the closure principle, 
Downward Causation results in a dilemma induced by the question whether all causes have to be 
physical.35 On the one hand, if this question is answered affirmatively, the result is reductive 
physicalism. Therefore, strong emergentism is false and emergent phenomena become mere 
epiphenomena.36 If it is answered negatively, on the other hand, and there can be non-physical causes, 
emergentism is not really physicalist at all but is rather a form of substance dualism or,37 worse, 
vitalism.38 
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 So strong emergentism can give us the sought-after kind of novelty only by weakening the 
dependence of emergents on their (physical) bases that is essential for the theory’s scientific credibility, 
preventing it from lapsing into the ‘spooky’, non-empirical demesnes of dualism and vitalism. This 
philosophical instability of emergentism in its key role as a form of non-reductive physicalism, which 
attempts to balance the notions of dependence and novelty, has been variously expressed by different 
philosophers. In connection with the concept of supervenience, the specific kind of dependence 
relation that he thinks emergentism requires, Kim says: 
 
 [I]f a relation is weak enough to be nonreductive, it tends   to be too weak to serve as 
a dependence relation; conversely,  when a relation is strong enough to give us dependence, it  
 tends to be too strong - strong enough to imply     
 reducibility.39 
 
And in connection with Downward Causation, whose possibility is implied by the ontological novelty 
that emergentism also requires, Peacocke writes: 
 
 the non-reductive physicalist cannot live without Downward   Causation, and the non-
reductive physicalist cannot live with  it.40 
 
 In this section, I have described the essential philosophical instability of the spectrum of 
emergentist theories. In general terms, the weaker the theory, the more scientifically credible it is 
(because of its greater compatibility with reductionism) but the less conceptually interesting it is and the 
less ripe for fruitful application in disciplines like theology; the sense in which emergent phenomena are 
novel can start to look trivial. The stronger the theory, by contrast, the more conceptually interesting it 
is and the more relevantly applicable. But owing to the tension between Downward Causation, which 
secures immunity from ontological reduction, and the closure principle, scientific credibility is lost, 
physicalism threatened and the route opened up to more exotic, and apparently implausible, 
philosophical positions like substance dualism and vitalism. Throughout this analysis, a distinction was 
operative between emergence as a commonplace concept freely used by many scientists (usually in a 
weak, epistemological form) and emergentism, a more speculative philosophical position which, 
especially in its stronger, ontological forms, is used in the attempt to establish non-reductive 
physicalism. 
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 As a way into the next section, I introduce some wider criticism of the ways in which the 
emergence discussion is currently framed, before outlining how these difficulties compromise the 
constructive theological application of emergentism. I conclude by exploring the philosophical 
potential for, and theological implications of, a pragmatist reframing of the emergence discussion. 
 
 
IV: Towards a Pragmatist Emergentism  
 
 Sami Pihlström convincingly argues that the spectrum of emergentist theories is pervaded by 
unhelpful and unchallenged philosophical assumptions. The two related assumptions, flagged by 
Pihlström, that I discuss here are (1) that causal concepts are sufficient exhaustively to capture the 
complexity of life and (2) metaphysical realism. 
 
 The causalist assumption is expressed in the popular emergentist dictum that ‘to be real is to 
have causal power’. Clayton, for example, shows his commitment to the formula that ontology equals 
epistemology plus causation in his claim that “if a system is explanatorily and causal irreducible, it is 
also ontologically irreducible.”41 The implication is that something that is purely epistemologically 
irreducible, which lacks irreducible causal power, is ontologically reducible. And what is ontologically 
reducible is an epiphenomenon; it is unreal. This thought that causal efficacy and reality are equivalent 
problematises a move sometimes made by emergentists: the argument from something’s causal efficacy 
to its existence. George Ellis uses his argument for Downward Causation (the view than non-physical 
quantities can have a physical effect) to establish that such phenomena “hence must be recognized as 
having a real existence”; the causal efficacy of the non-physical establishes, in his view, “a richer 
ontology than simple physicalism”.42 Similarly, in the specific context of mental causation, Clayton 
argues in the following way: 
 
 I wager that no level of explanation short of irreducibly    mental 
explanations will finally do an adequate job of    accounting for the human person. 
This means wagering on the   causal efficacy of the conscious or mental dimension of human 
 personhood. And of course, if it’s causally efficacious, it   must exist.43 
 
This argument can be formalized as follows: 
 
 1) To be real is to have causal power 
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 2) x has causal power 
 3) Therefore, x exists. 
 
 However, a problem arises when it comes to establishing the identity of x in an emergentist 
context. If existence and causal efficacy are equivalent, it seems odd to attempt to use one to establish 
the other. For how could one be more sure of something’s causal efficacy than one is of that thing’s 
existence as this rational justification requires? This question is especially urgent when the existence of 
emergent phenomena is the very point in question. The emergentist’s argument that the reality of x, the 
emergent phenomenon, can be established by pointing to its causal effects can always be countered by 
the suggestion that the emergentist is just incorrectly attributing observable effects to something that 
does not exist. Although those observable effects must have a cause, the opponent will concede, that 
cause is not the supposedly emergent entity that the emergentist claims it is. It is always possible 
incorrectly to attribute observable effects to a non-existent entity, as when a child attributes a broken 
toy to the causal activity of her imaginary friend. Moreover, depending on the precise meaning of 
‘existence’ involved, something’s existence is likely to be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
its causal efficacy. If something’s existence were a prerequisite for its causal efficacy, as seems the case, 
the emergentist could not attribute a given effect to an emergent cause without, in a circular manner, 
assuming the existence of such emergent causes - the very point to be established. 
 
 Pihlström wants to challenge the assumption behind the thought that to be real is indeed to 
have causal power. For this assumption leads to the emergentist thought that, if emergent phenomena 
are indeed real, then they must have causal power - the thought that Downward Causation is possible. 
This argument leads to the dilemma created by Downward Causation that Pihlström summarises in 
connection with the emergentist account of mind: 
 
 Emergentists…can have mental causation only by treating it as  something that does not 
belong to our unified scientific    picture of the world (which they do not want to 
do) or by    reducing it to the physical via a stronger notion of    
 supervenience (as Kim suggests).44 
 
Pihlström challenges the undefended emergentist assumption that the whole of human life can be 
captured in causal concepts,45 questions the reductionist assumptions that lead to the dilemma of 
Downward causation,46 and advances a pragmatist ‘dissolution’ of the dilemma.47 He uses the, in his 
view insoluble, problems associated with Downward Causation as a modus tollens against the causalist 
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picture that most emergentists assume without argument.48 Pihlström denies that everything in the 
world (including human rationality and moral responsibility) can be accounted for in physical and 
causal terms.49 Although a causal vocabulary may be necessary to account for the complexity of life, the 
emergentist’s (more or less explicit) assumption that it is therefore sufficient is simply mistaken.50 
Human beings operate, inseparably, in the realms of the normative as well as the factual, according to 
Pihlström, and the causalist assumption actually precludes a truly emergentist account of how the 
normative might be novel with respect to the factual.51 
 
 The alternative approach draws heavily on classical and contemporary pragmatist philosophy, 
challenging the second and related widespread emergentist assumption: metaphysical realism. This 
assumption leads to the cardinal distinctions, rehearsed above, between weak and strong emergence 
and between weak and strong forms of emergentism. In this context, a typical question raised is 
“whether there really are emergent properties (however they are defined) in the basic structure of the 
world itself, independently of our conceptualizations of the world.”52 As we saw in connection with 
Clayton, this question is also expressed in something like the following way: are emergent phenomena 
ontological, i.e. both epistemological and causally efficacious?  
 
 On Pihlström’s pragmatist approach, which he calls a ‘mild realism’, we carve the world up in 
different ways, identifying different properties, according to our conceptual schemes. There is no way 
to draw the metaphysical distinction between our conceptual contribution from that of the world as it 
is in itself because it is impossible to compare the accuracy of our conceptualisations with an 
indepdendent, unconceived reality.53 When this view is applied to the concept of emergence, emergents 
are not considered impotent or epiphenomenal if they lack causal power. A pragmatist approach is 
uninterested in the independent ontological reality (or otherwise) of emergent properties.54 Thus the 
problem of Downward Causation, with which most emergentists are preoccupied, becomes less urgent. 
Kim’s failure to salvage ‘real’ Downward Causation (his successful defence not of downward causation 
but only of downwardly causal explanation) is no longer seen as a failure, since “[t]his is all we may care 
about”.55 Since the pragmatist emergentist sees no point in arguing for a non-conceptual approach to 
Downward Causation,56 ‘real’ causal efficacy is no longer the distinctive marker of the reality of 
emergent phenomena. On a pragmatist approach,  
 
 [a]n emergent property can be regarded as real to the extent  that it provides a more efficient 
description (for some    purpose) of the configurational pattern with which it is   
 identified than a micro-level description of that same    configuration.57 
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We shall return to the important question of what such purposes might be. 
 
 While this view might superficially look like weak emergentism, the rejection of metaphysical 
realism actually entails that the distinction between weak and strong emergence falls apart. For the 
pragmatist, there can be no objects that are not also concepts.58 On this view, emergent properties are 
not conceived as independently real “but gain their ontological status from the practice-laden 
ontological commitments we make.”59 The pragmatist approach does not deny that emergence is 
ontological but rather that no ontology is separable from epistemology, since all ontology concerns a 
world that is humanly structured and conceptualized.60 This insight is drawn from Putnam,61 who 
resists reductively physicalist accounts of causation, insisting on the interest- or purpose-relative nature 
of the concept of causation and its dependence on the context of explanation, or conceptual scheme, in 
which it is used.62 Interestingly, as we might expect, Putnam also claims that “not even basic ontological 
notions such as existence have one fixed metaphysical privileged meaning or use.”63 (In this respect, the 
pragmatist approach to the issue of realism is strikingly similar to the phenomenological one.64) As 
Pihlström states, what the pragmatists question is the assumption that metaphysical realism is true. To 
separate causation off (in its designation as (part of) the ultimate ontological structure of reality) from 
causal explanation is to subscribe to metaphysical realism - the second assumption that is questioned by 
Pihlström’s pragmatist approach to the emergentist discussion.65 
 
 In summary, then, not only do the difficulties surrounding causation give us good reason to 
abandon (1) emergentism’s undefended causalist assumption, from a pragmatist perspective. Those 
difficulties can also be traced back to the broader (and equally undefended) emergentist assumption (2) 
of the truth of metaphysical realism. The pragmatist challenge to these assumptions in tandem points 
towards the radical reframing of the emergence discussion, which also undermines the cardinal 
distinction between weak and strong forms of emergentism, the ‘red thread’ running through almost all 
existing contributions to the debate. 
 
 
IV: Emergentism, Pragmatism and Theology 
 
 We have just seen in detail what the pragmatist critique of the current shape of the emergence 
debate looks like and what, from a pragmatist perspective, is wrong with the ways in which the relevant 
questions are currently being framed. Pihlström also sketches a positive proposal concerning a 
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pragmatist reframing of that debate, which I would like to introduce and build upon in the context of a 
critical discussion of the contemporary application of emergentism to theology. We have cursorily seen 
how the incompatibility of dependence and novelty in existing forms of emergentism compromises the 
philosophical coherence and superficial theological attractiveness of those theories.66 I show, in this 
final section, how Pihlström’s pragmatist proposal may not only help to resolve some of emergentism’s 
thorny philosophical problems but also prepare the ground for its more fruitful theological application. 
 
 The central problematic implication of the dominant way of framing strong emergentism is the 
following. While supervenience, which is held to be a necessary condition for strong emergence, is able 
to make mental causation ‘scientifically innocent’, it also renders it irrelevant to human mentality from a 
pragmatist perspective.67 The point can be substantiated by Putnam’s critique of Kim, which argues 
that the idea that the mental supervenes on the physical implies the absurd thought that there could be 
soulless entities without minds that are nonetheless physically indistinguishable from human beings.68 
Putnam refers to William James’s ‘Automatic Sweetheart’, a ‘remarkable’ thought experiment presented 
in The Meaning of Truth: 
 
 I thought of what I called an ‘automatic sweetheart,’ meaning  a soulless body which 
should be absolutely indistinguishable  from a spiritually animated maiden, laughing, talking,  
  blushing, nursing us, and performing all feminine offices as  tactfully and sweetly as if a 
soul were in her. Would anyone  regard her as a full equivalent? Certainly not…69 
 
Pihlström’s view is that a background assumption of most emergentists, which implies the intelligibility 
of the idea of there being an Automatic Sweetheart, should be rejected. James’s Cartesian thought 
experiment is made possible by the prevailing physicalist conception of the mind as a thing, which is 
dependent on an unhelpful dichotomy between epistemology and ontology, subject and object. Such a 
conception, which confuses our subjectivity, by which there are any objects at all, with yet another 
object, results in debates about whether there are strange, subjective 'objects' and, if so, how they are 
related to the more truly objective ones. From the pragmatist point of view, these debates misconstrue 
subjectivity as a special kind of objectivity and wrongly conceive the mind as a thing.70  
 
 From Putnam’s pragmatist perspective, we should jettison the presupposition that such 
reduction of the mental to the physical makes sense. Since emergentism is predicated on just such 
reductionist presuppositions (though, ironically, also designed to overcome them),71 Putnam denounces 
emergence as a ‘bad metaphor’ that “suggests that all the true statements expressible in the vocabulary 
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of the ‘basic’ sciences of physics, chemistry, biology … might have been true without there being 
consciousness or intentionality. In short, it suggests that we might conceivably have all been Automatic 
Sweethearts, and that it is ‘mysterious’ that we aren’t."72 From the pragmatist perspective, by contrast, 
according to James, “belief in the automatic sweetheart would not work, and in point of fact no one 
treats it as a serious hypothesis.”73 From this perspective, the scientific truths that Putnam mentions 
emerge out of human agency and out of the practices that we human agents engage in. The human 
world of lived experience and practice is the world that we carve up from scientific perspectives, and 
from innumerable others as well.74 
 
 It does not follow from Putnam’s criticism of the traditional understanding of emergence as a 
bad metaphor that the concept has no possible use. Indeed, although he accepts Putnam’s Jamesean 
arguments, Pihlström thinks that, when appropriately modified, the concept may well be useful in a 
description of the relationship between human agency and the lived world that arises out of it.75 
Continuing in this constructive vein, Pihlström suggests that once ontology is understood as being 
transcendentally constituted by, and grounded in, human agency and practice, the concept of 
emergence can return to its original task of describing the empirical world but within a philosophical 
framework that jettisons the problematic commitment to physicalism.76 Since it is the physicalist, 
causalist picture that makes Downward Causation problematic,77 the emergence discussion should be 
reframed according to the pragmatist ontology, which avoids this dilemma though a milder realism that 
rejects the physicalist and causalist background picture while remaining naturalistic. If we reject the 
assumption that the ontology of the physical world is independent of the conceptual work we do in the 
space of reasons, then we will conclude there is no independent 'emergence base' at all. This base will 
itself be understood to emerge from our practice of ontologizing and Pihlström further suggests that 
this practice itself "must be seen as emergent in relation to the physical world it constitutes".78 
 
 If Pihlström’s criticisms and positive, pragmatist proposals are well-taken, it will no longer be 
adequate to think of emergentism as being a cogent way of articulating non-reductive physicalism. 
Rather, the philosophical role of the concept of emergence will have to be revised. As a way into the 
question of the potential pragmatist role of the concept of emergence, it may be instructive to consider 
one field in which the concept has been regarded to be pragmatically useful, namely theology. 
 
 In Mind and Emergence, Clayton finds emergence valuable as a way of articulating the hierarchical 
structure of the entities produced by natural history and of the sciences that systematically study those 
entities.79 Referring to Sellars (interestingly), Clayton sees the point of emergentism as being not to 
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reconcile the conceptual framework of the human mind, human values and personhood with scientific 
enquiry but to connect the two.80 In Sellars’s language, the point is to relate the world as it is conceived 
by science to human purposes “and make it our world”.81 But in Clayton’s view, descriptions finally call 
for explanations.82 Clayton’s favoured explanation, in contrast to physicalist, vitalist and dualist ones, is 
the emergentist one “that the correct explanatory ontology has to include multiple levels of ‘really 
existing properties’, since brains, mental properties and interpersonal structures all exercise causal 
agency.”83 And in just the way that emergence is visible in the evolution of life, a fortiori (Clayton argues) 
it is also visible in the emergence of culture. For example, the concept of personhood does not appear 
as an ontological category in physics or chemistry but is basic to research in the social sciences.84 Thus 
emergentistically construed, personhood “is … a level of analysis that has no complete translation into 
a state of the body or brain - no matter how complete our neuroscience might be.”85 While brain and 
body may be necessary conditions for personhood, Clayton suggests, they are by no means sufficient.86 
Having reached this point, “the postulation of persons as self-conscious agents” (rather than as 
aggregations of microphysical particles),87 Clayton begins to advance his argument in the direction of 
theism.  
 
 Drawing on Nagel, Clayton argues that the content of the beliefs of such irreducible agents 
demands an explanation. He argues that it would take more than ‘naturalism’ (by which he seems to 
mean (reductive) physicalism) to justify the practically indispensable supposition that a correlation 
exists between human beliefs and the state of the world. Clayton’s view is that nothing internal to the 
world could provide such explanation or justification. That the world has a rational structure is either a 
Nagellian ‘brute’ datum or, as Clayton thinks, it in turn has a reason. Clayton concludes that the only 
reason that could function on this second-order level is the idea that the world was ‘made’ to be 
reasonable and was designed by an intentional agent, namely God.88 Thus, in contrast to Alexander’s 
suggestion that deity is itself emergent, Clayton’s argument concludes with “the postulation of 
transcendent mind” on the basis of a version of the argument from design.89 Unlike Alexander’s 
thoroughgoing theistic emergentism, Clayton abandons the emergentist schema with this postulation of 
the creative, divine mind. Having used emergentism to resist dualistic responses to the mind-body 
problem, Clayton does so at the cost of introducing theological dualism in his “conception of the 
relationship of the divine nature to the nature of the finite world.”90 Such dualism, he freely admits, 
goes “beyond the theoretic resources of emergence theory.”91 As Clayton summarises his conclusion:  
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 The theistic account concludes to a conscious intentional    being or force that 
preceded the evolutionary process and    whose creative intentions led, however 
indirectly, to the    emergence of intelligent life.92 
 
 In light of Pihlström’s pragmatist criticisms, Clayton’s argument can be seen to share the main 
difficulty faced by emergentist theories that rest on causalist assumptions but attempt to reach the level 
of mind or normativity: a version of the naturalistic fallacy. If to be real is to have causal power, then an 
emergentist account of mind, like the one Clayton defends, will eventually face the problem of 
Downward Causation. The conclusion of the (ontological) reality of the mental or normative requires a 
demonstration of their causal efficacy. But from the pragmatist perspective the normative sphere is not, 
by definition, made up of entities in that physicalist sense. Pihlström refers to this as physicalism’s 
‘blind spot’, arguing that physicalism is not even a candidate for truth (or falsity) since it eliminates or 
reduces away the normativity we attach to the pursuit of truth. It thereby destroys its own status as a 
thesis that could be true, justified and so on.93 The physicalist bracketing of the ontology of normativity 
compromises the possibility of stating and defending the physicalist thesis, which presupposes a 
commitment to just such a normative framework of inquiry.94 Pihlström argues that the physicalist, or 
the emergentist who starts out with a sympathy for physicalism’s causalist assumptions, is forced to 
reduce herself as an inquirer, together with the practice of inquiry, to a physical (or at least physically 
realised) object of enquiry.95 This amounts to a ‘fatal confusion’ between subjectivity and objectivity: 
the subject disappears from the physicalist view of the world.96 While it is supposed to be arrived at by 
means of inquiry, there is, in fact, no one to reach it, no one for whom it could be true or false, justified 
or unjustified.97 If the pursuit of truth is reduced to the physical or the causally efficacious in this way, 
then the pursuit itself is given up, together with anything it might yield - including the truth of 
physicalism as a potential rational commitment.98 
 
 The pragmatist perspective, by contrast, rejects such physicalistic assumptions together with the 
metaphysically realist view that there is anything like an emergence base out there in the world that 
exists independently of our inescapably normative practices of ontologizing. This perspective 
challenges the dichotomy between subject and object that makes possible the ‘fatal confusion’ just 
mentioned. Elaborating a point made by Dewey (and elaborated by Putnam), we might say that the 
distinction between subject and object may sometimes be useful but that the insistence on a dualistic 
understanding of that distinction or on a dichotomy between them, which renders the relationship 
between the distinguished items unintelligible (as happens, for example, when the dichotomy ramifies 
into a version of the naturalistic fallacy), is a philosophically ‘vicious affair’.99 Subject and object cannot 
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be logically independent of one another because our only means of access to the objective world is in 
and through our subjectivity. 
 
 None of this necessarily means that the idea of emergence should be abandoned. Indeed 
Pihlström thinks it can be used for something like its original purpose: as a way of articulating the 
relationship between the factual and the normative - what Sellars and McDowell distinguished as our 
‘first’ (animal) nature compared to our ‘second’ (cultural) nature and as the realm of causal law 
investigated by science compared to the ‘space of reasons’.100 Specifically, if it is reconstrued along 
pragmatist lines (without causalist assumptions, a dichotomous understanding of the subject-object 
relationship or, relatedly, a commitment to metaphysical realism), the concept of emergence can be 
used to articulate the relationship between the factual and the normative. It can be used in a pragmatist 
way to broaden the non-reductive physicalism that is usually associated with emergentist theories into 
non-reductive naturalism - a position that has been associated with pragmatism since Dewey.101 Such a 
position refuses to acknowledge dichotomies between nature and culture, fact and value.102 But, as 
Pihlström warns, an adequate understanding of the fact-value relationship demands a richer form of 
naturalism than those found in mainstream analytic philosophy of mind.103 It is just such a rich form of 
naturalism that pragmatism has developed: while the normative is not supernatural (values are not 
taken to be transcendent entities),104 neither is it reducible to the causal and the physical. Further, it is 
necessary to invoke values to attain a coherent concept of a fact. Although, as is often claimed, there 
would be no values without any facts, the reverse must also be true: in Putnam’s words, “[a] being with 
no values would have no facts either.”105 In short there is “no clean way to cut our human practice into 
a factual and a normative part.”106 Hence, the pragmatist reframing of the emergence discussion allows 
for acceptance of the principle of causal closure to be combined with the judgment that it is irrelevant 
since, for the pragmatist (who subscribes to non-reductive naturalism) the objective structures of the 
world emerge out of human agency, which is always already a normative act, “a move within the space 
of reasons”.107 From the pragmatist perspective, to pose the question of values is already to raise a 
normative question.108 With Pihlström, we may conclude from these pragmatist considerations that 
emergence is able to provide a promising picture of the fact-value entanglement. Values emerge out of 
facts, and are based upon them, and yet are also novel with respect to them and cannot be 
conceptually, ontologically or explanatorily reduced to a supposedly merely factual structure of the 
world such as that expressed in the causal laws and processes described by the natural sciences. 
Emergentism therefore becomes a way of cashing out the idea of non-reductive naturalism. Like 
mental states, values are seen as fully natural, yet irreducible to nature as the sciences describe it.109 
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 What effect would this pragmatist proposal have on the application of emergence in a 
theological context? Recall that the structure of Clayton’s argument, hanging on the ‘red thread’ - the 
dichotomy between weak and strong emergence - required him to abandon emergence at the 
theologically crucial moment: while making the transition from human personhood to divine 
transcendence. This gap was bridged by means of a version of the more ancient, and less scientifically 
credible, argument from design. But a pragmatist approach, as we have seen, abandons this dichotomy. 
It also abandons metaphysical realism, with its reductively physicalistic and causalist assumptions, 
because “many human capacities we take to ‘emerge’ from lower levels of reality can be accounted for 
in non causal terms”.110 This is perhaps especially true of the aesthetic and religious capacities of human 
beings. Perhaps, as many emergentists hoped, the discussion between science and religion can be 
enhanced. But, as I have shown, we have reason to think that most of the existing forms of 
emergentism suffer from serious, and perhaps insurmountable, obstacles to delivery on this hope. We 
should be optimistic, I think, that a new a new form of emergentism, appropriately informed by 
classical and contemporary pragmatism, would not need to be abandoned at the crucial moment and, 
consequently, has better prospects in this regard.111 I agree with Pihlström that, in the complex 
philosophical field of emergentism, “[t]he exciting issues are pragmatic”.112 I venture that this is true, a 
fortiori, of the theological application of emergentism in the science and religion debate. It is my sincere 
hope that, in both fields, the excitement will continue. 
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